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Domain Name System Operations W. Mekking
Internet-Draft NLnet Labs
Intended status: Standards Track June 29, 2010
Expires: December 31, 2010
Automated (DNSSEC) Child Parent Synchronization using DNS UPDATE
draft-mekking-dnsop-auto-cpsync-00
Abstract
This document proposes a way to synchronise existing trust anchors
automatically between a child zone and its parent. The algorithm can
be used for other Resource Records that are required to delegate from
a parent to a child such as NS and glue records.
Requirements Language
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on December 31, 2010.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2010 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents
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carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
described in the Simplified BSD License.
1. Introduction
This memo defines a way to synchronise existing trust anchors
automatically between a child zone and its parent. The algorithm can
be used for other Resource Records that are required to delegate from
a parent to a child such as NS and glue records.
To create a DNSSEC RFC 4035 [RFC4035] chain of trust, child zones
must submit their DNSKEYs, or hashes of their DNSKEYs, to their
parent zone. The parent zone publishes the hashes of the DNSKEYs in
the form of a DS record. The DNSKEY RRset at the child may change
over time. In order to keep the chain of trust intact, the DS
records at the parent zone also needs to be updated. The rolling of
the keys with the SEP bit on is one of the few tasks in DNSSEC that
yet has to be fully automated.
The DNS UPDATE mechanism RFC 2136 [RFC2136] can be used to push zone
changes to the parent.
To bootstrap the direct communication channel, information must be
exchanged in order to detect service location and granting update
privileges. A new or existing child zone can request a direct
communication channel with the parent. If the parent allows for
direct communication with child zones, the parent can share the
required data to set up the channel to the child zone. Once the
child has the required credentials, it can use the direct
communication channel with the parent to request zone changes related
to its delegation.
If a third party is involved, the third party can act on behalf of
the parent. In this case, the third party will give out the required
credentials to set up the communication channel.
It is RECOMMENDED that the direct communication channel is secured
with TSIG [RFC2845] or SIG0 [RFC2931].
2. Access and Update Control
The DNS UPDATE normally is used for granting update permissions to a
machine that is within the boundary of the same organization. This
document proposes to grant child zones the same permissions.
However, it MUST NOT be possible that a child zone updates
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information in the parent zone that falls outside the administrative
domain of the corresponding delegation. For example, it MUST NOT be
possible for a child zone to update the data that the parent is
authoritative for, or update a delegation that is pointed to a
different child zone. It MUST only be able to update records that
match one of the following:
Or: The owner name is equal the child zone name and RRtype is
delegation specific. Currently those are records with RRtype NS
or DS.
Or: The owner name is a subdomain of the child zone name and RRtype
is glue specific. Currently those are records with RRtype A or
AAAA.
This list may be expanded in the future, if there is need for more
delegation related zone content.
In case of adding or deleting delegation specific records, the DNSSEC
related RRs in the parent zone might need to be updated.
The service location may be handed out by the registrar during
bootstrap If this information is missing, the normal guidelines for
sending DNS UPDATE messages SHOULD be followed.
3. Update Mechanism
3.1. Child Duties
Updating the NS RRset or corresponding glue at the parent, an update
can be sent at any time. Updating the DS RRset is part of key
rollover, as described in RFC 4641 [RFC4641]. When performing a key
rollover that involves updating the RRset at the parent, the child
introduces a new DNSKEY in its zone that represents the security
entry point for determining the chain of trust. After a while, it
will revoke and/or remove the previous security entry point. The
timings when to update the DS RRset at the parent are described in
draft-dnsop-morris-dnssec-key-timing [keytiming]. When updating the
DS RRset at the parent automatically, these timing specifications
SHOULD be followed. To determine the propagation delays described in
this document, the child should poll the parent zone for a short
time, until the DS is visible at all parent name servers.
To discuss: A child zone might be unable to reach all parent name
servers.
The child notifies the parent of the requested changes by sending a
DNS UPDATE message. If it receives a NOERROR reply in return, the
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update is acknowledged by the parent zone. Otherwise, the child MAY
retry transmitting the update. In order to prevent duplicate
updates, it SHOULD follow the guidelines described in RFC 2136
[RFC2136].
3.2. Parent Duties
When the master DNS server of the parent receives a DNS UPDATE from
one of its children the following must be done:
Step 1: Check the TSIG/SIG0 credentials. In case of TSIG, the
parent should follow the TSIG processing described in section 3.2
of RFC 2845. In case of SIG0, the parent should follow the SIG0
processing described in section 3.2 of RFC 2931.
Step 2: Verify that the updates matches the update policy for child
zones.
Step 3: If verified, send back DNS UPDATE OK. Otherwise, send back
DNS UPDATE REFUSED.
Step 4: If verified, apply changes. How that is done is a matter of
policy.
3.3. Proxy considerations
Some environments don't allow for direct communication between parent
and child zone. In these case, the parent duties can be performed by
a different party (for example, the registar). The third party will
forward the update to the parent zone. In what format depends on
local policy.
4. Example BIND9 Configuration
This is how a parent zone can configure a policy to enable a child
zone synchronize delegation specific records. The first rule of the
update policy grants children to update their DS and NS records in
the parent zone, in this case example.com. The second rule of the
update policy grants children to update the corresponding glue
records.
key cs.example.com. {
algorithm HMAC-MD5;
secret "secretforcs";
}
key math.example.com. {
algorithm HMAC-MD5;
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secret "secretformath";
}
...
zone "example.com" {
type master;
file "example.com";
update-policy { grant *.example.com. self *.example.com. DS NS; };
update-policy { grant *.example.com. selfsub *.example.com. A AAAA;
};
};
5. Security Considerations
Automating the synchronization of (DNSSEC) records between the parent
and child created a new channel. We have recommended that this
channel should be secured with TSIG or SIG0. There is an advantage
and a disadvantage of the new security channel. The disadvantage is
that you create a new attack window for your DNSSEC credentials. If
the automated synchronization is used for updating DS records at the
parent, you SHOULD pick a cryptographically an equally strong or
stronger TSIG/SIG0 key than the strength of your DNSSEC keys.
The advantage is that if somehow your DNSSEC keys are compromised,
you can still use this channel to perform an emergency key rollover.
6. IANA Considerations
None.
7. Acknowledgments
Rickard Bellgrim, Wolfgang Nagele, Wouter Wijngaards and more.
8. References
8.1. Informative References
[RFC2136] Vixie, P., Thomson, S., Rekhter, Y., and J. Bound,
"Dynamic Updates in the Domain Name System (DNS
UPDATE)", RFC 2136, April 1997.
[RFC4641] Kolkman, O. and R. Gieben, "DNSSEC Operational
Practices", RFC 4641, September 2006.
[keytiming] Morris, S., Ihren, J., and J. Dickinson, "DNSSEC Key
Timing Considerations", March 2010.
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8.2. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[RFC2845] Vixie, P., Gudmundsson, O., Eastlake, D., and B.
Wellington, "Secret Key Transaction Authentication for
DNS (TSIG)", RFC 2845, May 2000.
[RFC2931] Eastlake, D., "DNS Request and Transaction Signatures (
SIG(0)s)", RFC 2931, September 2000.
[RFC4035] Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S.
Rose, "Protocol Modifications for the DNS Security
Extensions", RFC 4035, March 2005.
Author's Address
Matthijs Mekking
NLnet Labs
Science Park 140
Amsterdam 1098 XG
The Netherlands
EMail: matthijs@nlnetlabs.nl
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